International Gazette

Democracy of No: Voters Can Veto Everything, Build Nothing

Twenty-four hours after Israel’s polls closed on 27 October, nobody could say who had won. Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc had slipped to 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, with Likud still the biggest party on 27, but his opponents could not reach 61 either. A decade ago that would have been a story about Israel. Today it is a story about much of the democratic world.

The pattern is strange once you notice it. Electorates remain perfectly capable of producing majorities against someone. They have become poor at producing majorities for anything. In Wales in May, a YouGov poll found that the most common single reason for choosing a party was stopping Reform, cited by 14 percent, and tactical votes helped carry Plaid Cymru to 43 seats. Across Britain, the BBC’s projection from the local elections put Reform on 26 percent, the Greens on 18, Labour and the Conservatives on 17 each and the Liberal Democrats on 16, as the Brookings scholar E.J. Dionne has summarized. A party can lead that table with barely a quarter of the vote, while the rest of the country agrees only on what it dislikes.

Germany shows the slow arithmetic. In 1980 the two big parties took 87 percent of the West German vote. In 2025 they took 45 percent, and Friedrich Merz became chancellor with 28.5 percent. The only coalition that kept the far-right AfD out of government was the one neither partner wanted, and by the spring the AfD was leading national polls at around 28 percent, Dionne notes.

Governing by exhaustion

Elsewhere the symptoms look different but feel the same. France’s National Assembly sits in rough thirds. Its 2026 budget took months of upheaval and a series of no-confidence votes before it passed in early February, with Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu forcing parts of it through without a vote and surviving only because the Socialists declined to bring him down. In Denmark, Mette Frederiksen’s party finished first in March with 22 percent, a historically low result for it, and she returned as prime minister only on 1 June, at the head of a minority government, after months of haggling. In Slovenia, the president said in the spring that she would not name a minority-government leader because no majority coalition was in sight.

Call it governing by exhaustion. Coalitions form not because parties share a program but because every alternative is worse, and they arrive wounded. Budgets slip, reforms are diluted to what everyone can tolerate, and shortcuts such as France’s Article 49.3 become normal tools. Caretaker governments, which are supposed to be a brief interlude, stretch into the main event.

Why the machine stopped working

Analysts point to a handful of forces working at once. The old big-tent parties have shrunk. New parties on both flanks, and in the middle, have taken slices of the vote that used to stay inside two houses. Mainstream parties’ refusal to deal with the far right, the so-called firewall, removes combinations that once made the sums work, and it means the center must govern together or not at all. And voters punish whoever is in office quickly, so no coalition gets the time to deliver the results that would make it worth keeping.

There is a feedback loop here. When an election produces months of talks and a government no one voted for, some voters conclude that the ballot buys nothing, and they drift toward protest options. That splits the vote further and makes the next deadlock more likely.

Not everyone is stuck

The exceptions matter. In Hungary in April, opposition parties set aside their differences behind a single center-right challenger, Péter Magyar, and ended Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power; parliament elected him by 140 votes to 54. Dionne’s reading is that such unity is rare and usually needs a threat that voters see as existential. Nordic politics, meanwhile, has long run on coalition habits, and a common counterargument holds that a many-party parliament represents voters more faithfully than a manufactured majority ever did. Fragmentation is not automatically failure. It becomes paralysis when parties will not, or cannot, bargain.

What gets proposed

The remedies on the table are familiar and contested. Germany’s constructive vote of no confidence, which lets a parliament topple a chancellor only by electing a successor, is held up as a safeguard against empty censure motions. Runoff voting, higher thresholds and pre-election alliances each have supporters and critics, since every device that manufactures a majority also shrinks someone’s representation. In Israel, commentators were already calling for election reform before the final count was in.

The next test

Israel is the immediate case. One of the opposition leaders, Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett or Avigdor Liberman, would have to reconsider joining Netanyahu, or the opposition would need an arrangement with Arab parties that won a record 19 seats between the Joint List and Ra’am, according to Israeli press reports. Failing that, Brookings analyst William Galston has argued, the deadlock could force a new vote in 2027.

If it does, the lesson will not be about one country. Democracies have not lost the ability to express a will. They have lost the habit of turning it into a government, and the longer that takes, the more voters will ask what elections are for.

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